Assessing the Troubled Future of the Islamic Republic of Iran
They can't go on living like this, probably
Note: Information current as of the morning of 30 June 2025.
For nearly a half-century, the risk of war between Iran and the U.S. and/or Israel was ever present. Decades of shadow war and simmering tension with tit for tats, proxies, and various underhanded blows finally boiled over in 2024 as overt conventional military attacks between Iran and Israel. This was a new phase of the broader war between Israel and the Axis of Resistance after the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023. Now, in late June 2025, the “12-Day War” between Israel and the U.S. vs. Iran has somehow simultaneously reshaped and preserved the status quo ante bellum. How stable could this equilibrium possibly be? Not very, in my estimation.1
Reviewing the 12-Day War
In under two weeks, Israel (with the U.S. in a supporting role) just completely wiped the floor with Iran. As was foreshadowed by the conflict in 2024, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) quickly achieved air superiority and dominance by wrecking Iranian air defenses and forces. It conducted decapitation strikes against a frankly embarrassing number of Iranian senior military leaders, and proceeded to significantly damage Iran’s nuclear and missile production capacities. Along with a bunch of other government buildings and some oil infrastructure.
Iran was barely able to get missiles and drones to hit Israeli soil at all, and was essentially completely militarily ineffective. Iran’s allies in the Axis of Resistance, particularly Hezbollah, were already defeated or neutered. The IAF lost like a single drone. Then the U.S. came in with some B2s to drop some very special bombs on buried Iranian nuclear facilities. Nearly immediately thereafter, Trump abruptly forced the Iranians and Israelis to accept his ceasefire demands, ending the conflict for now in a remarkable feat of Art of the Deal.
One way to think about this is that Trump saw his friend fighting another guy and beating his face in, and joined in by kicking the guy in the nuts and then pulling his friend off and forcing them to stop. At the end of the 12-Day War, Israel had every ability to keep bombing Iran indefinitely while choking off its oil industry and bringing its economy to ruin. In all likelihood, the Islamic regime was only preserved by the grace of Donald J. Trump. The Iranians have not been very grateful, however:
Well that wasn’t so hard now was it?
Some commentors have remarked to the effect of: “If it was so easy to defeat Iran then why all the fearmongering all this time?” Well, frankly, nobody really knew it was going to be this easy. Iran spent decades, especially after 2003,2 worrying about how to defend itself from an attack by the U.S. and preparing for it. It was an open question just how deadly the stockpile of thousands of missiles in Lebanon and Iran would be if launched at Israeli cities. Could Iran close the Strait of Hormuz? How effective would an air campaign be against Iran? Containing Iran was always the easier choice because Iran generally tried to stay just below the limit of provoking a full war. Iran’s escalation in 2024 gave Israel the opportunity to test out an aerial attack. Iran’s leaders did not understand the implications and heed the warning.
The new status quo: A neutered Iran
Both the U.S. and Israel have expressed an indefinite policy of zero tolerance for an Iranian nuclear program, and Israel extends this to a missile program and terrorism.
This is I think an unprecedented occurrence in history—enforcing a neutralization of an adversary’s key military programs from the air after an unnegotiated ceasefire. Iran invested an immense amount into its “mostly peaceful”3 nuclear program, its missile industry and forces, and its proxies as part of its strategy for regional domination and ideological opposition to the U.S. and Israel. For Iran to accept this neutering would effectively be an unnegotiated surrender of several of the Islamic regime’s key objectives, and acceptance of domination by its bitterest adversary. It would be untenable to admit that publicly. It seems hardly tenable to concede it implicitly.
How high on their own supply?
Iran’s leaders have maintained in public and used propaganda to the effect that they actually dealt Israel and the U.S. a heavy blow and won the war.
Trump was not happy about it:
How much of this propaganda does Iran’s leadership class actually believe? How much of it does the average soldier or citizen believe? It’s undeniable to everyone just how badly Iran was damaged—you can’t hide the craters and deaths. It’s also undeniable that the IAF ruled the skies (even if you believe some aircraft were shot down) and that Israeli intelligence penetration was immense. The emperor has no clothes air defense or missile program, and everyone knows it. The IAF took away both Iran’s shield and sword.
Which way Iranian man?
There are perhaps three broad courses of action for the Islamic regime:
Open Defiance: As soon as possible, directly confront the U.S. and Israel by restarting military/nuclear programs and aggression.
Tacit Acceptance: Maintain defiant rhetoric, but do nothing to actually aggravate Israel or the U.S. indefinitely and focus on maintaining domestic control.
Covert Defiance: Maintain defiant rhetoric and domestic control, and “secretly” hit back at the U.S. and Israel via “undetectable” means like cyber warfare and terrorism, and attempt to “covertly” rebuild military/nuclear capabilities in a way that will actually work next time, like managing to rapidly build a nuclear warhead or figuring out how to actually shoot down an F-35.
Anyone remotely sane would recognize (1) is suicide by IAF. The problem with (2) is that eventually it’s going to be undeniable to at least the hardline military and security class—the regime’s key believers and protectors—that Iran has in fact implicitly surrendered. And (3) means hoping that Iran can, unlike every other time, “get away with it” and actually put up a real fight down the road. Additionally, Iran’s economy and the regime’s popularity were already on thin ice before all this. Not great! Historically, (3) is the obvious choice for Iran, as it’s something of a compromise between the hardline and the pragmatist camps. But in what manner and on what timeline and with what level of risk acceptance? The ongoing work to uncover Fordo is evidence for (3) being the chosen course of action. How long will the IAF permit that activity?
Evaluating the Islamic regime as a semi-rational actor
One of the trickiest issues in, well, all of social science and also geopolitics is the concept of a “rational actor.” Theory of mind is difficult at the best of times, and the ideology and psychology of the Islamic regime’s leadership class is highly particular. And we’re lumping together a few dozen or so key regime insiders into a semi-coherent single entity as the “regime,” with the Supreme Leader at the top. The Iranians are “semi-rational” in that they do a reasonably good job of pursuing their self-interest, as defined by (and this is key) their own goals. Their epistemic rationality may not be so great, but their instrumental rationality is usually decent at chasing their own utility function. That’s why for 46 years the Islamic regime has maintained domestic control and been a powerful regional actor. But it’s not so good that it kept them from being proven a paper tiger against their main opponent—one they chose—in a matter of days.4
The real and unresolved foundational problem is that a lot of their utility function is insane. Sure, “self-preservation” is in there, which is why they are not already obliterated. But a lot of otherwise intelligent people in the world labor under the delusion that the Islamic regime is not an ideologically motivated enterprise dedicated to forcibly exporting its brand of Shia Islam, combating the U.S. (Satanas Major), and destroying Israel (Satanas Minor5). They are not shy about this! They really mean it!6 Your ideas, as a typical Westerner, about their risk tolerance for doing “crazy” things are therefore unlikely to be well-calibrated by default.
Pretend for a moment you’re a (surviving) Iranian military leader taking stock of your situation. Iran’s economy is very depressed, its proxy network is largely defeated, and its military capabilities are either destroyed or rendered pointless. The Sword of Damocles, held by the IAF, hangs over your head. The regime’s domestic control—the #1 goal at all times—has been maintained thus far. What do you think the chances are of (covertly) acquiring/establishing an effective air defense system? Or (covertly) racing to a nuclear bomb? Or (covertly) rebuilding missile production? What would you advise the Supreme Leader to do?
Traditionally, Iran’s military and diplomatic strategy has been a tug of war between aggressive hardliners (e.g., the late Soleimani) and more risk-averse pragmatists (e.g., a Rohani), with Khamenei deciding whom to listen to at any given time. There is at least some evidence pragmatists and reformists are rising in status given the harsh realities of Iran’s defeat:
Four senior Iranian officials, familiar with current policy discussions in the government, said that in Mr. Khamenei’s absence, politicians and military commanders were forming alliances and vying for power. These factions have different visions of how Iran should move forward with its nuclear program, its negotiations with the United States and the standoff with Israel.
The faction that appears to have the upper hand at the moment is pushing for moderation and diplomacy, the four officials said. It includes Mr. Pezeshkian, who has publicly signaled his willingness to return to the bargaining table with the United States even after Mr. Trump bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities. Mr. Pezeshkian’s allies include the head of the judiciary, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, who is close to the supreme leader, and the new commander of the armed forces, Maj. Gen. Abdolrahim Mousavi.
At a cabinet meeting on Wednesday, Mr. Pezeshkian — who came to office last year promising to make Iran more prosperous, more open socially and more engaged with the West — signaled that it was time to change how the country was managed.
“The war and the unity among the people has created an opportunity to change our views on governance and the behavior of our officials,” Mr. Pezeshkian told his cabinet, according to an account of the meeting released by the president’s office. “This is a golden opportunity for change.”
However, it’s hard to push for building better relations with someone who just killed a bunch of your dear friends, and when the regime maintains actually it won the war. The Supreme Leader, Khamenei, is very old and it’s unclear how much longer he’ll last as the key decider, or who will replace him. But could he bear to go out of this life hiding in a bunker knowing he had plainly failed to achieve his life’s ambition? Will the hardliners give up, for some considerable time at least, their cherished mission of attacking Israel and/or the U.S. to avenge their lost loved ones?
Mowing the grass of a lawn of unknown size
If the present equilibrium lasts weeks into months into years, it seems most likely that Israel will have cause to “mow the grass” to keep in check Iranian attempts to cross Israel’s red lines.
There are many wildcards and contingencies here:
Will hardliners and pragmatists be able to find compromises on strategy?
Will Iran’s economy weaken to the point mass uprisings ensue?
How violently will the regime respond? Will that turn into regime collapse?
How aggressive will Israel be in response to Iran violating a red line?
How aggressively will Iran try to respond? Will that turn into full-on war again?
Is some kind of robust peace deal even possible?
How long will Khamenei retain power?
Will a hardliner or a pragmatist replace Khamenei?
Is it possible for the Islamic regime to evolve into a saner version of itself?
Will Trump get the U.S. militarily involved again?
Will Israel (and/or the U.S.) actively foster regime collapse/change?
Forecasting (poorly)
Given the above considerations, here’s where my gut is on the blurry probability of broad outcomes.
Possible, but unlikely:
Neutered Islamic regime at least tacitly accepts defeat and survives indefinitely as a shadow of its former self.
Quite possible, even likely:
Defiant Iran and Israel go back to war in coming weeks/months; economic and/or regime collapse.
Very likely:
Israel mows the grass; a mostly neutered Islamic regime survives indefinitely.
Very likely:
Israel mows the grass; economic and/or regime collapse within a few years.
I think it’s almost certain that Israel will have cause to mow the Iranian grass because I have a hard time imagining the Iranian regime, or at least some rogue hardline element, will not try to cross Israel’s red lines (and be caught doing so). I also struggle to imagine that pragmatist and reformist camps will transition the regime into something more tolerable without hardliners reasserting control. I have much less certainty about the chances of economic and/or regime collapse, but it’s certainly a very real possibility. Probably more likely than not in the coming year or two.
The obvious cop out is that any number of curve balls could enter the scene such that I am shown to have been insufficiently imaginative or wise. In my defense, President Trump did a 180 from “total surrender” and “regime change” to “ceasefire now” in like 72 hours. The Israelis and Iranians, however, are more consistent in their underlying goals and behaviors. The Israelis have been openly advocating for regime change, in recognition that’s probably the only real solution to Iran as an enduring threat. The Iranians remain at least rhetorically defiant. Something has to give.
You’ll have to take my word for it, but I am an actual armchair expert on this one.
One of the greatest historical ironies I’m aware of is the fact Iran paused its nuclear weapons program in 2003 as a result of Bush’s, uh, “counterproliferation efforts.” Funnily enough, Iran also hosts Al Qaeda leadership.
There is a difference between weaponization and nuclear power, but no one should kid themselves that Iran wasn’t pursuing the latter as a means of getting closer to the former.
See also: Putin’s delusional estimation of his military success in an invasion of Ukraine.
No, I’m not going to cite the copious evidence here anymore than I would for the shape of the Earth. If you think those statements are not overwhelmingly backed by the statements and actions of the Islamic regime over the last 46 years, then you are either stunningly misinformed or willfully in denial. Looking at you, Tucker.